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POLITICAL FERMENT IN FRANCE

by

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with the aid of the Research Staff of the Foreign Policy Association

INTRODUCTION

IN the face of a rising tide of discontent and a trend toward dictatorship in many European countries, France long appeared to be the only major Continental state retaining a large degree of economic stability and respect for democratic government. In the elections of May 1932 the French people had returned a Parliament definitely liberal in complexion, and even in the following year, despite Hitler's advent to power, seemed to maintain a remarkable *sang-froid* Cabinets, it is true, succeeded each other fairly rapidly, but ministerial instability had been too characteristic of French parliamentary government to be generally regarded as a portent of significant change. The world consequently experienced a rather rude awakening when early in 1934, within the space of a fortnight, two Cabinets enjoying the confidence of Parliament were compelled in succession to yield before the rioting of Paris mobs. The liberal régime had been suddenly supplanted by a "non-partisan" ministry of national union, headed by former President Gaston Doumergue and pledged to govern with a strong hand.

The riots culminating in the formation of this government expressed a profound dissatisfaction which had long been brewing under the surface. The Stavisky scandal, involving a number of politicians, only brought the discontent to a focus. It added the charge of corruption to the grievances of incompetence, vacillation and weakness which had been steadily accumulating

against the régime, and enabled the conservative Right to marshal the growing anti-parliamentary sentiment for a successful assault on the government of the Left.

For some time the French had been faced with problems of increasing gravity. Although the economic crisis reached France comparatively late, it affected the country's economic life with growing severity during 1932 and 1933. Official figures indicating a record unemployment of 350,930 in February 1934 not only failed to reflect accurately the decline in employment, which was probably about five times as large,¹ but furnished no clue to the status of the small entrepreneurs, peasants and shopkeepers who still constitute the bulk of the French population. More significant were the figures denoting a general decline in commercial and industrial activity. Receipts from the turnover or sales tax were 34 per cent less in February 1934 than in 1929, and the production index stood at 106 compared with 139 in 1929. Foreign trade had dropped from about 108 billion francs in 1929 to a little less than 47 billion in 1933. Finally, bankruptcies had risen alarmingly from a monthly average of 474 in 1928 to 827 in the first quarter of 1934.²

In addition the country was confronted with foreign problems of great moment to its future. Reparation and war debts, disarmament and rearmament, revision of the peace treaties—these and other issues pressed for settlement and necessitated prompt and decisive action.

THE RADICAL SOCIALIST REGIME

The governments which faced these problems following the 1932 elections were greatly handicapped by their inability to command a stable majority in Parliament. The elections had been a combined triumph for the Socialists led by Léon Blum and the Radical Socialists headed by Edouard Her-

riot.³ Taking advantage of the requirement that a second poll must be held whenever no candidate receives 50 per cent of the vote cast, the two parties had agreed in virtually all cases to pool their votes on the second ballot in order to defeat the conserva-

1. Cf. *La Lutte*, March 18, 1934. It has been pointed out that employment statistics reveal that 7,309 enterprises which on February 1, 1930 employed 2,624,788 workers, employed less than two million on January 1, 1934.

2. Statistics from *Bulletin de la statistique générale de la France et du service d'observation des prix*, Supplément mensuel, April, 1934.

3. For an analysis of the electoral results, cf. B. M. E. Léger, *Les opinions politiques des provinces françaises* (Paris, T. Gamber, 1934), p. 35-41.

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tive candidates of the Right. When it was proposed to continue the same cooperation in Parliament, however, the minimum demands on which the Socialists conditioned their collaboration in the government were rejected by Herriot.⁴ The Radical Socialist party, although committed to a measure of social reform, was primarily recruited among the small bourgeoisie, which is hostile to socialism. And the followers of Léon Blum, while not revolutionary, could not for the most part be persuaded to participate in a bourgeois government or to give the Radical Socialists their unreserved support.

Together with the Socialists and a few small groups of the Left, the Radical Socialists would have had a stable majority in the Chamber of Deputies.⁵ Failure to reach an agreement with the Socialists forced Herriot's party to resort to unstable minority governments whose members were recruited solely from its own ranks or from closely allied groups. A majority could not be secured by an alliance with the Centre which would have alienated altogether too much support on the Left. As a result of this parliamentary situation successive Radical Socialist governments were compelled to steer a rather tortuous course between the Left and the Right. To a degree uncommon even in French parliamentary politics, they had to spend most of their time in conciliating the opposition and persuading their supporters not to desert. Under these circumstances a firm and consistent policy became well-nigh impossible at a time when determined action by a strong government was imperative.

Within the space of twenty months—from June 1932 to February 1934—six Radical Socialist Cabinets were defeated after only a brief tenure of office:

4. Cf. *L'Europe Nouvelle*, June 11, 1932.

5. The political complexion of the 1932 Chamber of Deputies was as follows:

<i>Name of group or party</i>	<i>Number of deputies</i>	
RIGHT		
Independents	14	
Social Republicans	18	
Economic, Social and Peasant Action	8	40
RIGHT CENTRE		
Republican Federation	41	
Republican Centre	36	
Republicans of the Centre	6	
Republicans of the Left	28	111
LEFT CENTRE		
Popular Democrats	16	
Independents of the Left	23	
Radical Left	47	86
LEFT		
Radical Socialists	160	
Independent Left	15	
Republican Socialists	12	
French Socialists	13	
Socialists	131	331
EXTREME LEFT		
Workers' Unity	9	
Communists	10	19
No group	28	28
		615

Cf. *Le Temps*, July 14, 1932.

Edouard Herriot	June 4-December 14, 1932
Joseph Paul-Boncour	December 18, 1932-January 28, 1933
Edouard Daladier	January 31-October 23, 1933
Albert Sarraut	October 26-November 23, 1933
Camille Chautemps ..	November 26, 1933-January 27, 1934
Edouard Daladier	January 30-February 7, 1934

Desertion of the Socialists caused the overthrow of all but the last two ministries.

STRUGGLE OVER THE BUDGET

The handling of government finances best illustrated the weakness of the various Radical Socialist ministries and their inability to adhere to any clear-cut policy in the face of pressure both from within Parliament and from organized groups outside the legislature. The Herriot government which took office in June 1932 inherited a difficult financial situation from its predecessors. Declining tax receipts, combined with continuous progression in expenditures,⁶ had left deficits of 6,707 and 5,611 million francs in the last two fiscal years and promised a similarly large deficiency for 1932. In addition, the Treasury was required to cover the deficits of French railways, which reached a total sum of 12,567 million francs from 1929 to 1933 inclusive.⁷

To meet this situation all conservatives urged the achievement of a balanced budget by drastic reduction in the cost of government. Steps were advocated to end the disproportion between expenses, which had more than doubled since 1913, and national income, which was scarcely greater than before the war.⁸ In this way business confidence would be restored and urgent relief brought to disgruntled taxpayers. Such a course was also represented as indispensable to a revival of the languishing export industries and the tourist trade, both of which were adversely affected by the devaluation of many foreign currencies.⁹ Since most French people were reluctant to devalue the franc in view of their previous experience with inflation, the adoption of a general deflationary policy was urged as the only solution. Reduction in government expenses was regarded as especially necessary to

6. Despite certain tax increases, receipts dropped from 45,065 million francs in 1930-1931 to 36,611 million in 1933, while expenses continued to mount from 45,366 million francs in 1929 to 55,500 million in 1933. Cf. *Chambre des Députés*, 15e législature, session de 1933, *Rapport fait au nom de la Commission des Finances chargée d'examiner le projet de loi portant fixation du Budget Général de l'exercice 1933*. (Hereafter cited as *Chambre des Députés, Rapport sur le Budget Général, 1933* . . .)

7. *Le Temps*, April 30, 1934.

8. Raphael Alibert, "La déflation et le budget," *Revue Politique et Parlementaire*, June 1933.

9. A comparison of price indices on a gold basis from 1931 to January 1934 reveals that English and American prices declined 30.5 per cent and 38 per cent respectively, as compared with a fall of only 12.3 per cent in French prices. Cf. "Le problème des prix de revient français," *Journal des Débats* (weekly edition), March 23, 1934.

achieve lower production costs, because taxes absorbed from a quarter to a third of the national income.¹⁰ For the same reason conservatives demanded a decrease in the financial burdens imposed on commerce and industry by the compulsory social insurance system which went into effect in 1930.¹¹

The exponents of deflation held that economies could best be effected at the expense of civil servants and war veterans. In justification they pointed out that the number of government employees had increased steadily from 619,000 in 1914 to 857,000 in 1933,¹² while their total yearly compensation of 12 billion francs was almost double that paid before the war.¹³ Civil and military pensions required over four billion francs annually¹⁴—more than twice the sum spent in 1913; and expenditure for war veterans amounted to 2,511 million francs in 1932 as compared with 910 million in 1929.¹⁵

Socialists and others of radical sympathies, however, regarded a balanced budget as a "fetish" and denounced any attempt to achieve it as "chimerical." In their opinion budgetary deflation at the expense of government personnel and war veterans could only lead to a further diminution of purchasing power. The government was urged instead to embark on a program stimulating economic activity through extensive public works. Only in this way could the continual decline in tax receipts be reversed and the budget brought eventually into equilibrium.

Confronted with a choice between these two courses, the Herriot government and its successors adhered at least in theory to the school advocating a balanced budget. In pursuing this goal, however, the Radical Socialist ministries met with much opposition. Within the Chamber of Deputies the Socialists created many obstacles and the Finance Commission frequently amended the government's financial program beyond recognition. In addition, every ministry had to deal with the Senate, which often demonstrated its preference for a conservative financial policy by rejecting the proposals passed by the Chamber after much wrangling and compromise.

10. According to the National Industrial Conference Board, taxation absorbed 25.2 per cent of French income during 1931. Presumably the percentage has increased with a further decline in income. Cf. *New York Times*, April 29, 1934.

11. Contributions by employers and employees to the insurance fund aggregated about 11.5 billion francs by the end of 1933, while the state subsidies totalled 2.5 billion. Cf. *Le Temps*, April 12, 1934.

12. Government communiqué, *Le Temps*, April 6, 1934.

13. J. F. Compeyrot, "Les conditions de l'assainissement budgétaire," *Revue Politique et Parlementaire*, October 1933.

14. *Ibid.*

15. Chambre des Députés, *Rapport sur le Budget Général, 1933*, cited, p. XV-L.

OPPOSITION OUTSIDE PARLIAMENT

Finally, the government had a well-nigh impossible task in propitiating the organized groups outside Parliament. Government employees, the majority of whom are organized into powerful syndicates affiliated with the socialist Confederation of Labor (*Confédération Générale du Travail*),¹⁶ applied all forms of pressure, including occasional brief strikes, in order to prevent any reduction in their salaries and pensions. The various groups of war veterans, federated in an organization with over three million members, protested bitterly against any curtailment of their claims. On the other hand, numerous commercial and industrial organizations vociferously demanded drastic cuts in the cost of government.

At first the Herriot Cabinet met with considerable success. In July 1932 Parliament was persuaded to approve measures reducing the deficits for 1932 and 1933, although the government's requests for economies and additional taxes were considerably curtailed.¹⁷ In September a loan conversion enabled the government to save a substantial sum in debt charges.¹⁸ With tax receipts declining, however, a balanced budget was by no means achieved, and on December 14 Premier Herriot was voted out of office before he could obtain further action.

Succeeding Cabinets encountered greater difficulties. After only a little more than a month the Cabinet of Paul-Boncour was defeated on January 28, 1933, when Socialists and conservatives combined to reject its financial program. The 1933 budget was not finally passed until May 31, and then only because the Daladier government yielded to the Chamber and abandoned at least temporarily its efforts to balance receipts and expenses.¹⁹ When the government renewed in the fall its attack on the budgetary deficit, the Socialists again withdrew their support on a proposal to reduce the salary of civil servants and precipitated another Cabinet crisis on October 23. Confidence ebbed, and large sums of gold were withdrawn from the Bank of France.²⁰ Within a month the succeeding ministry headed by

16. For an account of the syndicalist movement among civil servants, cf. W. R. Sharp, *The French Civil Service: Bureaucracy in Transition* (New York, Macmillan, 1931), p. 460-508.

17. "Chronique Financière," *Revue Politique et Parlementaire*, August 1932. The deficit for 1932 was cut by 333 million francs; that for 1933, by some 2,570 million. Appropriations for national defense during 1933 were reduced 1,485 million francs.

18. *Ibid.*, October 1933. The budget was relieved to the extent of 1,332 million francs.

19. *Ibid.*, June 1933. The budget as passed showed an estimated deficit of 3,625 million francs.

20. *Ibid.*, November 1933.

Albert Sarraut fell on the same issue as its predecessor. The next Cabinet, that of Camille Chautemps, succeeded in persuading Parliament on December 23 to accept a more modest financial program, but when the last Radical Socialist ministry gave way to Doumergue a large deficit still existed.

The Radical Socialists thus failed to carry out a reduction in expenses sufficiently drastic to satisfy the conservatives and produce the economic benefits which were held to justify a deflationary policy. The public debt had increased more than 20 billion francs,²¹ and the market value of government bonds had undergone a considerable slump.²² At the same time the deadlock produced by prolonged parliamentary battles over the budget had served to increase popular disgust with parliamentary government.

FAILURE TO SOLVE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

Nor were the few attempts made to tackle specific economic problems conspicuously successful, as illustrated by the efforts to check the fall in wheat prices and reduce the foreign trade deficit.

Due to an extremely high tariff and milling regulations, France had become virtually self-sufficient in wheat, and farmers had been assured a high price independent of world market fluctuations.²³ But in the summer of 1932 the prospect of a large harvest caused prices to slump suddenly from 166 to 106 francs per quintal. In response to the immediate clamor for intervention, the government progressively reduced the percentage of foreign wheat used in the manufacture of flour, until in March 1933 all foreign wheat imports for this purpose were cut off.²⁴ Through a law promulgated on January 26, 1933 the government also undertook to check a further drop in prices by encouraging farmers to carry over part of their wheat until the next year. Premiums to defray the cost of storage were granted, and a sum of 300 million francs voted to guarantee farmers' cooperatives against price declines if they agreed to withhold their grain from the market.²⁵ Unfortunately the surplus was so large that the guar-

antee fund proved inadequate. To add to the government's worries, 1933 brought an even larger harvest.²⁶ Another law, enacted in July, sought to prohibit the sale of wheat at a price lower than 115 francs,²⁷ but that also proved ineffective. With a huge surplus weighing on the market, farmers were compelled either to keep their grain or to sell it illegally at prices substantially below the fixed minimum.²⁸ And the government was blamed for the failure of its measures.

Although the Radical Socialists had criticized the policy of previous governments as excessively protectionist and destructive of French export trade, they continued and even increased protection of the home market. Not only were the quota restrictions on imports extended, but taxes on import licenses were added. Strenuous efforts were made to recover the right to raise tariff rates which had been stabilized in a number of commercial treaties concluded from 1927 to 1929.²⁹ In order to obtain concessions for French exports, a new quota policy was applied at the beginning of 1934. The global import quota distributed among the countries exporting to France was cut to only one-quarter of the former amount, and the remaining three-quarters were employed as a weapon to extract trade concessions.³⁰ Although this policy proved successful in a few cases, its application involved France in a number of acrimonious disputes with its best customers. Germany and Great Britain refused to be dragooned into concessions. Germany retaliated by reducing its own quotas on French goods, whereupon France on January 19, 1934 denounced the Franco-German commercial treaty.³¹ Great Britain replied with a 20 per cent surtax on French imports, which the French government countered by denouncing the commercial conventions of 1826 and 1882 guaranteeing most-favored-nation treatment to the British.³² The Doumergue Cabinet inherited these unsettled disputes.

26. Production in 1933 was 98,511,200 quintals as compared with 90,771,340 in 1932. Cf. *Le Temps*, May 8, 1934.

27. For a discussion of the provisions of this law, cf. Louis Pichat, "La taxation du prix du blé," *Revue Politique et Parlementaire*, July 1933. The law also provided subsidies for farmers who agreed to denature their wheat for animal food and included provisions designed to encourage exports.

28. Cf. J. de Pesquidoux, "La crise du blé," *Revue des deux Mondes*, April 15, 1934; also memorandum prepared by millers and grain merchants, *Le Temps*, April 11, 1934.

29. To this end agreements were concluded modifying the treaties with Germany (December 28, 1932), Belgium (July 1933), and Czechoslovakia (May 11, 1933); and the treaty with Switzerland was denounced on June 1, 1933, when that country declined to consent to the requested alterations. Cf. Julius Lautman, "Les tendances actuelles de la politique des accords commerciaux," *Revue Politique et Parlementaire*, March 1934.

30. Paul Naudin, "La politique commerciale de la France au début de 1934," *L'Europe Nouvelle*, January 24, 1934.

31. *Ibid.*

32. Lautman, "Les tendances actuelles de la politique des accords commerciaux," *ibid.*

21. The total public debt, exclusive of war debts, was 299,899 million francs on December 31, 1933, as compared with 279,087 million on May 31, 1932. Cf. *The Economist* (London), March 10, 1934, p. 516.

22. Cf. André Tardieu, *L'heure de la décision* (Paris, Flammarion, 1934), p. 104. From April 1932 to February 1934 government rents declined on the average about 20 per cent in value.

23. Louis Pichat, "La question du blé," *Revue Politique et Parlementaire*, December 1932. The average annual value of the wheat crop is 10 to 12 billion francs.

24. Louis Pichat, "La défense du marché du blé," *Revue Politique et Parlementaire*, May 1933.

25. *Ibid.* The minimum price to be guaranteed by the government was fixed at 115 francs by a decree of March 8, 1933.

DEPARTURES FROM TRADITIONAL FOREIGN POLICY

While the economic and financial problems pressing for solution were serious, the most critical issues confronting the Radical Socialist governments were those relating to foreign policy. The Left came to power just when Germany was rapidly drifting into extreme nationalism and growing more exigent in its demands. To meet this situation the Left ministries frequently departed—sometimes by choice but most often by force of circumstances—from the traditional tenets of French policy. In this way they incurred not only the violent opposition of the nationalists, but at times ran directly counter to the course advocated by Léon Blum's Socialists.

Almost immediately after taking office in June 1932, the Herriot government was confronted with Germany's demand for the total abolition of reparation payments at the conference of Lausanne. Although France had always insisted on German payments sufficient not only to cover its war debt annuities to Great Britain and the United States but also to compensate it at least in part for the material damage wrought by the war, Premier Herriot consented to almost total cancellation of reparation obligations without previously obtaining a release from war debts.³³ When the government subsequently sought parliamentary approval to meet a war debt payment on December 15, 1932, the Right and the Socialists combined to oust it from power.

In disarmament policy, too, long-standing principles were reversed. Since the war French governments had resisted any measure of disarmament unless the restrictions on German armaments specified in the Treaty of Versailles were maintained, and unless other countries consented to implement League machinery for the peaceful settlement of international disputes by iron-clad pledges to aid victims of aggression. In resisting German demands for legal armament equality throughout the summer of 1932, the Herriot government at first followed this traditional policy.³⁴ Nevertheless, the French memorandum transmitted to the Disarmament Conference on November 14, 1932 made some concession to equality in the form of a proposal to base all Continental European armies on a short-term conscript system.³⁵ French nationalists immediately denounced this proposal as a

dangerous precedent for revision of the Versailles Treaty,³⁶ while the Socialists criticized the project because it exempted the overseas forces of European countries and foreshadowed a measure of rearmament by Germany.³⁷ Even sharper opposition was aroused when on December 11, 1932 Premier Herriot signed the so-called five-power declaration at Geneva as the price of Germany's return to the Disarmament Conference. This declaration affirmed that one of the aims of the conference would be to grant Germany "equality of rights in a system which would provide security for all nations."³⁸

It remained for the Daladier government to make an even more significant departure from previous French policy. During the consideration and modification of the British draft disarmament convention,³⁹ M. Daladier abandoned the traditional French insistence on the conclusion of a pact of mutual assistance and agreed to accept a convention providing no security guarantees other than a system of international supervision over armaments.⁴⁰ Although reduction in French armaments was conditioned on the satisfactory operation of the scheme for supervision during a trial period, French nationalists condemned the government for betraying the security of the fatherland.⁴¹ The determined opposition of the Socialists was also incurred when, following Germany's dramatic exit from the League of Nations and the Disarmament Conference in October 1933, the Chautemps Cabinet responded to Hitler's overtures for a direct exchange of views. The Socialists were convinced that the direct negotiations carried on with the German government during December 1933 and January 1934 served only to place a premium on German intransigence. In their opinion, disarmament could be achieved only within the framework of the League of Nations.⁴²

Direct negotiations with Hitler, assailed by both Socialists and nationalists, in reality continued a policy inaugurated by the Daladier Cabinet. The latter had already demonstrated a predilection for direct contact be-

36. Cf. Tardieu, *L'heure de la décision*, cited, p. 86-7.

37. Cf. leading articles by Léon Blum, *Le Populaire*, November 17-29, 1932.

38. For the text of the declaration, cf. Stone, "The World Disarmament Conference: Second Stage," cited, p. 274.

39. For a detailed discussion of the British Draft Convention, which was submitted at Geneva on March 16, 1933, cf. W. T. Stone, "The Disarmament Crisis 1933," *Foreign Policy Reports*, October 25, 1933.

40. The convention did provide a universal pledge to consult in the event of a breach or threatened breach of the Pact of Paris, and proposed that Continental European states enter into definite commitments to aid victims of aggression. Adhesion to the European pact, however, was to be entirely voluntary. Cf. Stone, "The Disarmament Crisis," cited, p. 188-9.

41. Tardieu, *L'heure de la décision*, cited, p. 87-8.

42. Cf. the following leading articles by Léon Blum in *Le Populaire*: October 11, 17 and 29, and November 11, 12 and 23, 1933.

33. M. S. Wertheimer, "The Lausanne Reparation Settlement," *Foreign Policy Reports*, November 23, 1932.

34. W. T. Stone, "The World Disarmament Conference: Second Stage," *Foreign Policy Reports*, January 18, 1933, p. 272-3; cf. also the exchange of notes between the French and German governments, *L'Europe Nouvelle*, September 24, 1932.

35. For a discussion of this memorandum, cf. Stone, "The World Disarmament Conference: Second Stage," cited, p. 274-7.

tween the great powers by signing on June 7, 1933 the Four-Power pact through which Mussolini hoped to secure the collaboration of Italy, Great Britain, France and Germany in the solution of European problems. Although the French government had insisted successfully on radical revision of those original provisions of the pact which emphasized the principle of treaty revision and implied the establishment of a European directorate in disregard of the rights of small powers,⁴³ the nationalist opposition

attacked the pact as disgraceful abandonment of France's traditional allies. When the Little Entente countries manifested an increasingly independent attitude toward France, and Poland went as far as to conclude a pact of non-aggression with Germany, the blame for these developments was placed on the Radical Socialist régime.⁴⁴ The Socialists, on the other hand, saw in the Four-Power pact a betrayal of the League of Nations and its fundamental precepts—open diplomacy and state equality.

NEW POLITICAL MOVEMENTS

While successive Radical Socialist governments were struggling more or less ineffectually with foreign and domestic problems, discontent increased and found expression in a multiplicity of movements directed against the existing governmental and economic system. The younger generation and the war veterans were most active in their opposition to the "régime." Youth was called upon to pool its energy in an attempt to achieve "reconstruction"; and certain groups of war veterans appealed for a revival of the "front spirit" in order to bring about a movement for "national renovation." Revolutions abroad—the Communist experiment in Russia, Hitlerism in Germany, Fascism in Italy and the New Deal in America—impressed many Frenchmen with their dynamic spirit and strengthened the belief that the French political system should likewise be adapted to the times.

These various movements, manifested in conservative as well as radical circles, differed both in organization and program. Some were militant and disciplined, others unorganized and largely intellectual in character. Those conservative in sympathy emphasized their nationalism, while those of radical tendency placed economic and social reform in the forefront. Some showed definite fascist leanings; others professed abhorrence of fascism as something alien to the French spirit. Yet, although divergent in aims, they were united in opposition both to parliamentary government as it functioned in France and to economic liberalism. Under various slogans, all appealed for national unity.

FASCISM OF THE RIGHT?

The most militant of these organizations were affiliated with the Right. Among them was the royalist *Ligue d'Action Française* founded in 1905 and counting in 1934 some 60,000 active members. Although in advocating a royalist restoration it espoused a

forlorn cause, the intellectual brilliancy of its leaders—Charles Maurras and Léon Daudet—and its appeals for an authoritarian government attracted the support of many young people, particularly students.⁴⁵ With the aid of shock troops, known as the *Commissaires d'Action Française* and the *Camelots du Roi*, the royalists carried on an intensive campaign against Parliament and all radical parties. Abroad they championed a nationalist policy; at home, restoration of a monarchy in which individual liberty would be safeguarded by decentralization and the creation of local bodies endowed with a large degree of autonomy and organized on an occupational and regional basis.⁴⁶

An organization similar in character but without royalist leanings was the *Jeunesses Patriotes* led by Pierre Taittinger, a conservative member of the Chamber of Deputies. By 1934 it had grown to a membership of about 240,000.⁴⁷ Like the *Action Française*, it possessed shock troops consisting of well-disciplined units of fifty men, subject to quasi-military drill and armed with truncheons.⁴⁸ The purpose of the organization was originally confined to the advocacy of a militant nationalist foreign policy, but more recently it has added a vague economic philosophy as an appeal to youth. Its aims as expounded by M. Taittinger—suppression of all parties, popular election of a "leader," and a "controlled" economic system⁴⁹—seem to border closely on fascism.

With a somewhat identical program the *Solidarité Française*, founded by the perfume manufacturer and newspaper-owner François Coty, developed rapidly to a

43. For the successive versions of the Four-Power pact, cf. *L'Europe Nouvelle*, July 22, 1933.

44. Tardieu, *L'heure de la décision*, cited, p. 89-92.

45. The *Action Française* is said to exercise a direct influence on no less than 200,000 people. Cf. Pierre Frédérix, "L'Action directe et ses troupes en France," *Revue de Paris*, May 1, 1934, p. 113.

46. Cf. Ch. T. Muret, *French Royalist Doctrines since the Revolution* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1933), p. 298.

47. "Enquête sur les événements de février," *Le Temps*, April 19, 1934.

48. *Ibid.*, *Le Temps*, March 8, 1934.

49. Cf. the interviews with M. Taittinger in *Revue Mondiale* ("Où tendent les forces nouvelles?"), April 15, 1934, and in the weekly periodical 1934 ("Sommes-nous en période révolutionnaire?"), May 2, 1934.

membership of about 250,000.⁵⁰ It also organized uniformed storm troops which were particularly active in anti-government demonstrations in Paris. Frankly fascist and modeled closely on the German Nazis were the *Francists* led by Marcel Bucard. This group claimed nearly 13,000 members.⁵¹

The *Croix de Feu*, founded in 1927 by Colonel de LaRocque, a retired army officer who had distinguished himself for bravery in the World War and in Morocco, was recruited among ex-service men.⁵² By the beginning of 1934 it comprised about 50,000 members, organized along military lines. A group of some 100,000 sympathizers was rallied to the organization, and a special association known as the National Volunteers was formed to include the children of active members.⁵³ Aside from its desire to foster patriotism and defend the peace treaties, the *Croix de Feu* expressed a determination to make the "general welfare" prevail over group interests. Its economic program demanded reduction in taxes and respect for private property. It advocated state control over business life, but proposed that direction be left to economic corporations organized along occupational lines.⁵⁴

Mention should also be made of two loosely organized groups—the *Fédération des Contribuables* (Taxpayers' Federation) and the *Union Nationale des Combattants*. The first included some 700,000 adherents and participated frequently in anti-parliamentary demonstrations although, save for tax reduction, it lacked a definite program. The second represented the most "national" element among the war veterans and claimed a membership of 870,000.

Aside from the organized groups more or less allied with the Right, a number of movements, intellectual in character, developed among young Frenchmen as a protest against the existing political and economic order. *Ordre Nouveau*, *Préludes*, *Esprit*, *Réaction*, *Nouvelles Equipes*, *Troisième Force*, *Homme Nouveau*, *Homme Réel*—these were some of the many movements testifying to the extent of the ferment within the younger generation.

Two main tendencies were represented in this intellectual revolt. One was directed primarily toward the renaissance of the "individual personality" which, its proponents believed, was crushed under all systems, in-

cluding capitalism, communism and fascism. Recognizing that every member of society should be assured satisfaction of his material needs, they proposed that all classes share the automatic and laborious work with which the rationalized machinery of capitalism burdened the proletariat alone, so that every individual might have freedom to develop his creative impulses. Both democracy and dictatorship were rejected as the negation of the individual, who was to be emancipated from the hegemony of the state by a thorough-going decentralization in favor of largely autonomous bodies organized along regional and professional lines. While extreme nationalism was opposed, the spiritual and cultural value of the nation as a "natural" association of individuals was cherished.⁵⁵

FASCISM OF THE LEFT?

Another and more radical tendency was expressed in a sort of "fascism of the Left." Its youthful adherents were exponents of advanced ideas on economic and social planning, but were convinced that such ideas could not be realized through an unstable parliamentary government. They were disillusioned with the failure of the Radical Socialist and Socialist parties to effect far-reaching economic reform, and advocated the replacement of Parliament by a chamber of corporations on the Italian model.⁵⁶

This type of fascism appealed to some of the older adherents of the Left as well. According to one group, it was necessary to unite all the new political forces within the country in order to bring about a "revolution of the centre, fascism of the Left, or quite simply an extra-parliamentary resurrection of this old ideal of a controlled economy which the Radical Socialists have shown themselves incapable of realizing."⁵⁸ The struggle was to be on two fronts: against "feudal capitalistic" elements on the one hand, and "Marxists" on the other; its aim, "to establish in France, with the variations which our situation demands, the fascist economic régime, without resorting needlessly to the means of violence which foreign fascist movements have employed."⁵⁹ The fascists of the Left, although disillusioned

50. Frédéric, "L'Action directe et ses troupes en France," cited, p. 115; also "Enquête sur les événements de février," *Le Temps*, March 8, 1934.

51. *Le Temps*, March 22, 1934. For its program, cf. *Lu*, February 16, March 2, 1934. A small group of dissident *Francists* espoused anti-Semitism.

52. *Lu*, March 9, 1934.

53. *Le Temps*, "Enquête sur les événements de février," March 8, April 15, 1934.

54. Cf. special supplement to the October 1933 number of *Flambeau*, organ of the *Croix de Feu*.

55. These ideas were represented chiefly by the group centering about the periodical *L'Ordre Nouveau*, directed by Daniel Rops, Alexandre Marc, and Denis de Rougemont. Similar views, although leaning more toward a modified socialism, were championed in the review *L'Esprit*, directed by Emmanuel Mounier. For a brief exposition of these movements, cf. "Où tendent les forces nouvelles?" *Revue Mondiale*, April 15, 1934, and "Enquête sur le rajeunissement de la France," *Grande Revue*, March 1934. A more detailed exposition may be found in the works of Robert Aron and Arnaud Dandieu: *Décadence de la Nation Française* (Paris, 1931); *Le Cancer Américain* (Paris, 1931); and *La Révolution Nécessaire* (Paris, 1933).

56. The best exposition of these ideas may be found in the weekly *La Lutte des Jeunes*, edited by Bertrand de Jouvenel.

58. Declaration by Alfred Fabre-Luce, Pierre Dominique, and Jean Prevost in their publication *Pamphlet*, February 23, 1934.

59. Alfred Fabre-Luce, "L'heure des néos," *Pamphlet*, March 2, 1934.

with the League of Nations, believed in the necessity of international cooperation. They maintained, however, that France had to be united internally before any international understanding could be achieved.⁶⁰

While disappointment with the Radical Socialist party caused one faction to entertain fascism, another minority, represented by the militant young deputy Gaston Bergéry, turned to a different solution and sought to unite all radical forces within a "Common Front" for a combined assault on "reactionary fascism."⁶¹

Growing popular agitation against Parliament was almost directly responsible for a significant schism in the Socialist party. Observing the progress of events since the 1932 elections, a considerable number of Socialist deputies became more and more convinced that the party's policy of rejecting direct participation in the government and according but uncertain support to successive Radical Socialist Cabinets was likely to prove suicidal. In their opinion this policy made the Socialists responsible for the instability of the government and thus contributed directly to the growth of fascist sentiment. But in advocating positive collaboration with the bourgeois Radical Socialist party, the right wing Socialists came into direct conflict with the orthodox party leadership. A crisis was reached in May 1933 when the majority of Socialist deputies voted for the budget in direct defiance of party instructions. A party congress, convened at Paris during July, officially condemned this betrayal of orthodox Marxism,⁶² and when a minority refused to submit to discipline its

leaders were expelled from the party on November 5, 1933.⁶³ These, together with their followers, totaling some thirty deputies, organized a new party—the Socialist Party of France, formally launched in Paris on December 3, 1933.⁶⁴

The leaders of the "neo-socialist" movement—Adrien Marquet, Marcel Déat and B. Montagnon—summed up their program in the slogan "Order, Authority, Nation."⁶⁵ They believed that the policy of calmly awaiting the day when capitalism would inevitably collapse and power would fall automatically into the hands of the proletariat deprived socialism of the dynamic quality necessary to success. Such a policy would lead straight to fascism, since events in other countries had demonstrated that the middle classes were much more revolutionary than the proletariat and would, when threatened with chaos and destruction, seek refuge in fascism rather than socialism. The "neo-socialist" program, therefore, sought to appeal to the middle classes as well as the workers. Order was to be assured through a planned economy in which production was not to be nationalized but planned and directed through corporations modeled on those of Italy.⁶⁶ Authority and prevalence of the "general interest" would be enforced through the state, thoroughly reorganized so as to eliminate "stagnant parliamentarism."⁶⁷ Nationalism the "neo-socialists" recognized as a fact; accordingly they declined to await an international solution of economic problems and frankly proclaimed the necessity of organizing economic life on a national plane, without, however, resorting to the extremes of autarchy.⁶⁸

THE DOUMERGUE GOVERNMENT AND NATIONAL UNION

THE STAVISKY SCANDAL

With these various movements expressing the prevailing unrest in the country, the revelation of a far-reaching scandal early in January 1934 was sufficient to overthrow the Radical Socialist régime. The scandal, centering about one Serge Alexander Stavisky, resembled in its political and financial aspects many *affaires* which had troubled the history of the Third Republic. The number of such cases had multiplied in recent years, the Hanau, Oustric, Banque Nationale de Crédit, Aéropostale and other scandals following each other in rapid succession. Their frequency pointed to serious defects in the French political system. The interrelation-

ship of business, the press and the government facilitated frauds, and chaotic conditions in the administrative services made detection difficult. Moreover, the willingness of a number of politicians and parliamentarians to use their influence in behalf of people whose records and activities they either ignored or failed to investigate frequently defeated justice.

The Stavisky case brought these defects into sharp relief. Stavisky's career as a gambler and swindler, begun on a modest scale before the war, gradually extended. Arrested in July 1926 and charged with

63. *Le Populaire*, November 6, 1933.

64. Cf. *Le Temps*, December 4, 5, 1933.

65. *Néo-Socialisme! Ordre, Autorité, Nation*—three speeches by Montagnon, Déat and Marquet, with preface and commentary by Max Bonnafous (Paris, Grasset, 1933); for the manifesto of the party, cf. *Le Temps*, November 19, 1933.

66. Interview with Marcel Déat, "Où tendent les forces nouvelles," *Revue Mondiale*, April 15, 1934.

67. The "neo-socialists" thus rejected the orthodox socialist conception of the state as an instrument of class oppression. Cf. Edmond Laskine, "La crise socialiste et le néo-socialisme," *Revue d'Economie Politique*, January-February 1934.

68. *Néo-Socialisme!*, cited, p. 99.

60. Alfred Fabre-Luce, "Politique intérieure d'abord," *Pamphlet*, December 8, 1933.

61. For the origins and program of the *Front Commun*, cf. *La Lutte*, June 3, 1934.

62. For the debates and resolutions of this congress, cf. *Le Populaire*, July 15-18, 1933; also André Guérin, "Le congrès socialiste et la scission morale," *L'Europe Nouvelle*, July 22, 1933.

stealing securities valued at several million francs, he was released on bail in December 1927, ostensibly because of ill health. Benefiting from no less than nineteen postponements of his trial, he continued his nefarious activities with impunity, despite the fact that police reports drew attention to his conduct. He maintained close relations with a number of politicians: one Radical Socialist deputy was his confidant and adviser; another, who had been a Cabinet Minister, served as one of his lawyers; and an influential journalist was his chief liaison agent with the administration. Boards of directors recruited chiefly among retired government functionaries, including a former Ambassador, a retired General and an ex-Prefect of Police, provided a splendid façade for his enterprises. The largest frauds were perpetrated through the municipal pawnshop (*Crédit Municipal*) of Bayonne, which Stavisky founded in 1932 under the patronage of the city's mayor, also a Radical Socialist deputy. Through this institution he issued bonds to a total face value of 500 to 650 million francs, all supposedly guaranteed by pawn pledges but in reality almost worthless.⁷⁰

OVERTHROW OF THE RADICAL SOCIALISTS

Discovery of the pawnshop frauds created a political furor. The revelations were immediately exploited by conservatives in a concerted drive on the Radical Socialist régime; for, although conservatives were involved as well, the Radical Socialists were most directly implicated. Two former Ministers, one Minister, one former Under-Secretary of State, and three other Radical Socialist deputies were compromised. M. Dalimier, Minister of Colonies in the Chautemps government, had, while Minister of Labor, signed a letter recommending investment in Bayonne bonds. Royalist and conservative newspapers launched a campaign of vilification and abuse against the government. The supposed suicide of Stavisky at Chamonix on January 8, just as he was about to be arrested, was represented as a deliberate murder engineered by the police in order to prevent damaging revelations. Stavisky was depicted as the financier of the Radical Socialist party; and the rejection by the Chautemps Cabinet of a parliamentary investigation was interpreted as an attempt to "hush up" the affair. To add to the government's difficulties the Minister of Justice, M. Raynaldy, was shown to have been connected with a scandal which had occurred a few years previously. Militant organizations of the Right staged numerous riots and demonstrations. On January 27

the Chautemps Cabinet was finally compelled to resign as a result of this extra-parliamentary agitation.

Returning as Premier, Edouard Daladier strove valiantly to arrest the anti-parliamentary tide. His efforts, prejudiced by certain ill-advised and unpopular administrative changes, proved fruitless. When the new government met Parliament on February 6, thousands of demonstrators, swollen by onlookers, congregated in the Place de la Concorde. Attacks were launched on the large police and army forces mobilized to bar the way to the Chamber of Deputies. In the fighting which lasted throughout the night seventeen people were killed and several thousand wounded. The next morning the Cabinet resigned, convinced that its continuance would only lead to further bloodshed; and Gaston Doumergue was called from retirement to head a government of national union.

Since February 9 France has in theory enjoyed a period of "political truce" under the national government presided over by the 72-year-old Gaston Doumergue. His Cabinet includes on the extreme Right Louis Marin; on the extreme Left Adrien Marquet, leader of the "neo-socialists." Within its ranks are found most of the old political leaders: André Tardieu, Pierre Laval, Edouard Herriot and Louis Barthou. In Parliament only the Socialists and Communists offer determined opposition.

The new government has adopted a nationalist foreign policy, expressing determined opposition to German rearmament.⁷¹ Following the publication of the German budget showing substantial increases in expenditures for national defense, direct negotiations were ended and the disarmament question returned to the League of Nations.⁷² Strenuous efforts have been made to build up a diplomatic coalition affording security against Germany. In April and June Foreign Minister Barthou visited the capitals of Poland and the Little Entente in order to strengthen the ties which had been loosened under the Radical Socialist régime. He also consolidated the Franco-Soviet rapprochement inaugurated by the previous administration with the conclusion of a non-aggression pact and a commercial treaty.⁷³ The Doumergue government, moreover, concluded a Franco-British commercial agreement on June 27, and M. Barthou, on a visit to London which closed on July 10, appar-

71. Great Britain, *Further Memoranda on Disarmament*, February 14 to April 17, 1934, Cmd. 4559 (London, His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1934), p. 11.

72. *Ibid.*, p. 20.

73. The non-aggression pact was signed on November 29, 1932; the commercial treaty on January 11, 1934. Cf. Vera M. Dean, "The Soviet Union as a European Power," *Foreign Policy Reports*, August 2, 1933, and "Toward a New Balance of Power in Europe," *ibid.*, May 9, 1934.

70. For further details about Stavisky's activities, cf. "L'échafaudage des combinaisons Stavisky," *Lu*, January 12, 1934; also minutes of the parliamentary inquiry into the Stavisky affair, *Le Temps*, March, April, May and June 1934.

ently succeeded in improving France's relations with Great Britain.

FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEFLATION

In the economic sphere the government has followed the policy of deflation long prescribed by conservatives. Authorized by decree⁷⁴ to balance the budget, the Cabinet cut government expenses by four billion francs, reducing the number of functionaries by 10 per cent and decreasing salaries, pensions and allowances.⁷⁵ Similar reductions were effected in payments to war veterans.⁷⁶ In addition, half the railway deficit was covered by decrees diminishing salary and pension charges and providing for coordination of rail and road transport.⁷⁷ As a result of these measures government *rentes* have risen in value, and large quantities of gold

have flowed back into the coffers of the Bank of France.⁷⁸ These economies have been partly offset, however, by the supplementary appropriations of 3,120 million francs obtained to complete the national defense program during the next few years.⁷⁹

As part of its general deflationary policy the government has embarked on a campaign to reduce the high cost of living.⁸⁰ A liberalization of import restrictions has been promised.⁸¹ Certain tax reforms are also to assist in lowering prices, but since direct and not indirect taxes are to be cut the reduction in living costs may not materialize.⁸² Finally, as a mild counteractant to the deflationary program, employment is to be stimulated by enabling local governments to borrow money for the execution of public works.⁸³

GOVERNMENTAL REFORM—DEMOCRACY OR FASCISM?

Into the internal political situation Premier Doumergue has vainly sought to introduce some "appeasement." The overthrow of the Radical Socialist government had been the work of a militant minority in Paris and did not fail to arouse protest from the provinces and the laboring classes. The parliamentary investigations into the riots of February 6 and into the Stavisky scandal produced bitter political recrimination; and the mysterious death on February 21 of a magistrate, Albert Prince, just before he was scheduled to make important revelations in the Stavisky case, was immediately ascribed by large sections of the Paris press to a freemasonic "maffia," protected by the police and the Radical Socialist party. Although the government was temporarily strengthened by the electoral defeat administered on April 29 to the radical deputy Gaston Bergéry and by the decision of the Radical Socialists to continue their support of the Cabinet, political ferment has not materially abated. Socialists and Communists, with their labor federations totaling about 1,000,000 and 300,000 members respectively, do not represent the only opposition to the régime. Many among the younger generation of Frenchmen regard the present Cabinet as merely a clique of old politicians incapable of realizing a genuinely "new deal." Organizations such as the

Croix de Feu, *Solidarité Française* and others continue an active campaign for recruits.

Political forces are being marshalled today in the realization that the present government of "truce" must sometime give way to another, and that decisions reached during the truce concerning governmental reform will largely determine the character of the succeeding régime. Some reform strengthening the government is generally recognized to be desirable, and the question is being considered by a parliamentary commission. In the past sixty-three years the Third Republic has survived the fall of ninety-five Cabinets, but the conviction is now widespread that France can no longer afford such governmental instability.

The conservatives in Parliament and in the Cabinet want in general to strengthen the government by increasing its direct reliance on the electorate as against Parliament.⁸⁴ They wish, first of all, to restore the practice of dissolving Parliament when a government is defeated, and to make the right of dissolution independent of the Senate's consent as required by the present con-

74. This power was granted until June 30, 1934. Decrees were to be rendered in council, countersigned by the Premier and Minister of Finance, and submitted to Parliament for ratification before October 31, 1934.

75. Reductions in salaries ranged from 5 to 10 per cent. For text of the economy decrees, cf. *Le Temps*, April 6, 1934. In protest against the decrees the syndicates of government employees ordered the cessation of all work for one hour on April 16; owing to the threat of disciplinary measures by the government, the strike was only partially successful. Cf. *Le Temps*, April 17 and 18, 1934.

76. *Le Temps*, April 16, 1934.

77. The economies thus effected were estimated at two billion francs. Cf. *Le Temps*, April 21, 1934.

78. Three per cent *rentes* rose from 65.90 francs on February 7 to 78.40 francs on May 17, 1934. Other government bonds showed corresponding gains. Gold holdings of the Bank of France increased from 74,883 million francs on February 9 to 77,465 million on May 31.

79. Cf. *New York Times*, June 15, 1934.

80. Communiqué of the Ministry of Finance, *Le Temps*, April 23, 1934; also Cabinet communiqué, *Le Temps*, May 4, 1934. By November 1933 the cost of living had declined only 12½ per cent. Cf. *Le Temps*, April 2, 1934.

81. In a communiqué published in *Le Temps* on May 4, 1934 the Cabinet held the protectionist policy of previous governments at least partially responsible for the high cost of living.

82. For the text of the fiscal reform bill introduced in the Chamber on June 26, cf. *Le Temps*, May 31, 1934.

83. Seventy-five per cent of the annual accumulation in social insurance funds has been set aside for public works loans, which are to bear an interest rate of 5½ per cent. In this way 1½ billion francs is expected to be made available every year until December 31, 1940. Cf. communiqué of the Ministry of Labor, *Le Temps*, May 17, 1934.

84. For the best exposition of their ideas, cf. Tardieu, *L'heure de la décision*, cited; also Maurice Ordinaire, *La révision de la constitution* (preface by Gaston Doumergue; Paris, Payot, 1934).

stitution.⁸⁵ Since the day in 1877 when President MacMahon dissolved the Chamber of Deputies in a vain attempt to secure a royalist majority, dissolution has smacked so much of a coup d'état that no government has resorted to it. Rehabilitation of the practice is now advocated in order to enable the French Premier, like his English prototype, to exercise a firmer control over the Chamber of Deputies.⁸⁶ The conservatives also want to adopt the English parliamentary rule which denies Parliament the right to initiate proposals involving new or increased expenditures.⁸⁷ Finally, they advocate many electoral reforms, including abolition of the present small, single-member constituencies, adoption of proportional representation and woman's suffrage, and reduction in the number of deputies. By discouraging independent candidates and promoting the formation of larger and better disciplined parties, a system of proportional representation is expected to reduce the number of parliamentary groups, many of which are but loose aggregations of deputies with independent inclinations. At present the existence of no less than eighteen such groups in the Chamber of Deputies is a constant threat to governmental stability. Another objective of the conservatives is the elimination of the two-ballot system which in the past has enabled Radical Socialists and Socialists to pool their strength in the second poll.

The democratic reforms thus advocated by most of the conservative leaders⁸⁸ are regarded by many as inadequate. A conviction that the state must be organized along economic as well as political lines has become widespread, particularly among the younger generation. Some form of corporate representation for economic interests has received the endorsement of such widely different

groups as the General Confederation of War Veterans,⁸⁹ representing over three million members, and the cardinals and archbishops of France.⁹⁰ No unanimity exists, however, regarding the structure, functions and purposes of such corporate organization. Conservatives regard it primarily as a means of curbing competition and controlling the syndicates of workers and government employees;⁹¹ radicals, as a means of collective economic planning. While most of its advocates would confine the legislative functions of an eventual central chamber of corporations to aiding and advising Parliament in the elaboration of economic and social measures, some would even supplant Parliament entirely. On the whole, concrete and well-elaborated projects of a corporate system are lacking.

The Third Republic, in its present form, has survived many crises. Strong movements for governmental reform have periodically arisen, only to subside as the crisis which produced them decreased in intensity. The forces opposed to change have always been formidable, particularly in the provinces; and they may be too powerful to overcome even in the present period of stress and strain. Should economic conditions improve, the French people may once more demonstrate their continued attachment to the present system, with all its faults, rather than resort to new and untried experiments. Today, however, political ferment is deeper and more widespread than at any time since the Dreyfus case. Many new movements are striving to reconcile traditional French individualism with a measure of authority and order. If they succeed against heavy odds in burying their differences and rally around a strong leader, France may not remain immune from the revolutionary changes which have affected other European countries.

85. The French constitution, which consists in reality of three constitutional laws voted in 1875, together with amendments subsequently adopted, may be amended if both the Sénat and the Chamber separately approve and then unite in a joint session to adopt the proposed amendment by a majority vote.

86. Tardieu, *L'heure de la décision*, cited, p. 178-86.

87. *Ibid.*, p. 190-204.

88. M. Tardieu even recommends the adoption of some method of popular referendum as a check on Parliament. Cf. *L'heure de la décision*, cited, p. 219-232.

89. In March 1934 the National Council of the Confederation of War Veterans decided that the Confederation should abandon its previous non-political character and intervene in public life, "in order to insure the predominance of the general interest over private interests." It urged that the economic, professional and social forces in the country be organized on a national and regional basis and allowed to participate in the management of public affairs. Cf. *Le Temps*, March 27, 1934.

90. The church dignitaries expressed the hope that the "chaos of individualism and competition" might be remedied by a corporation of professional organizations with "its sections, its jurisdiction, and its rights of representation before the vested and public powers." Cf. *The French Say* . . . (bimonthly survey of the French press and periodicals), May 1, 1934.

91. Cf. manifesto of the conservative *Alliance Démocratique*, *Le Temps*, May 10, 1934.